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Abstract
We address the mechanism design problem of an exchange setting suitable make-
take fees to attract liquidity on its platform. Using a principal-agent approach,
we provide the optimal compensation scheme of a market maker in quasi-explicit
form. This contract depends essentially on the market maker inventory trajectory
and on the volatility of the asset. We also provide the optimal quotes that should
be displayed by the market maker. The simplicity of our formulas allows us to
analyze in details the effects of optimal contracting with an exchange, compared
to a situation without contract. We show in particular that it improves liquidity
and reduces trading costs for investors. We extend our study to an oligopoly of
symmetric exchanges and we study the impact of such common agency policy on
the system.
Keywords: Make-take fees, market making, financial regulation, high-frequency trading,
principal-agent problem, stochastic control.
1 Introduction
Due to the fragmentation of financial markets, exchanges are nowadays in competition.
The traditional international exchanges are challenged by alternative trading venues, see
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[19]. Consequently, they have to find innovative ways to attract liquidity on their plat-
forms. One solution is to use a maker-taker fees system, that is a rule enabling them to
charge in an asymmetric way liquidity provision and liquidity consumption. The most
classical setting, used by many exchanges (such as Nasdaq, Euronext, BATS Chi-X...), is
of course to subsidize the former while taxing the latter. In practice, this means associat-
ing a fee rebate to executed limit orders and applying a transaction cost for market orders.
In the recent years, the topic of make-take fees has been quite controversial. Make-take
fees policies are seen as a major facilitating factor to the emergence of a new type of
market makers aiming at collecting fee rebates: the high frequency traders. As stated by
the Securities and Exchanges commission in [31]: “Highly automated exchange systems
and liquidity rebates have helped establish a business model for a new type of profes-
sional liquidity provider that is distinct from the more traditional exchange specialist and
over-the-counter market maker.” The concern with high frequency traders becoming the
new liquidity providers is two-fold. First, their presence implies that slower traders no
longer have access to the limit order book, or only in unfavorable situations when high
frequency traders do not wish to support liquidity. This leads to the second classical
criticism against high frequency market makers: they tend to leave the market in time of
stress, see [4, 24, 25, 28] for detailed investigations about high frequency market making
activity.
From an academic viewpoint, studies of make-take fees structures and their impact on
the welfare of the markets have been mostly empirical, or carried out in rather stylized
models. An interesting theory, suggested in [2] and developed in [6] is that make-take
fees have actually no impact on trading costs in the sense that the cum fee bid-ask spread
should not depend on the make-take fees policy. This result is consistent with the em-
pirical findings in [20, 22]. Nevertheless, it is clearly shown in these works that many
important trading parameters such as depths, volumes or price impact do depend on the
make-take fees structure, see also [14]. Furthermore, the idea of the neutrality of the
make-take fees schedule is also tempered in [12] where the authors show theoretically that
make-take fees may increase welfare of markets provided the tick size is not equal to zero,
see also [5]. More importantly, the results above are obtained in tractable but rather
simple discrete-time models that one may want to revisit to be closer to market reality.
In this work, our goal is to provide a quantitative and operational answer to the question
of relevant make-take fees. To do so, we take the position of an exchange (or of the regu-
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lator) aiming at attracting liquidity. The exchange is looking for the best make-take fees
policy to offer to market makers in order to maximize its utility. In other words, it wants
to design an optimal contract with the market marker to create an incentive to increase
liquidity. We solve the problem the exchange is facing and we do not consider the more
involved question of global social welfare. Nevertheless, we have in mind that increasing
the liquidity (what the exchange is aiming at) should be beneficial for the welfare of all
the agents, what is confirmed in our empirical results. This paper is to our knowledge
the first addressing the issue of make-take fees in a realistic continuous-time framework.
As a first step, we consider a single market maker in a non-fragmented market, such as
for example many fixed income markets which represent some of the most liquid assets in
the world. We next consider the case of multiple symmetric exchanges.
Incentive theory has emerged in the 1970s in economics to model how a financial agent can
delegate the management of an output process to another agent. Let us recall the formal-
ism of principal-agent problems from the seminal works of Mirrlees [26] and Holmstro¨m
[15]. A principal aims at contracting with an agent who provides efforts to manage an
output process impacting the wealth of the principal. The principal is not able to control
directly the output process since she cannot decide the efforts made by the agent. In our
case, the principal is the exchange, the agent is the market maker, the effort corresponds
to the quality of the liquidity provided by the market maker (essentially the size of the
bid-ask spread proposed by the market maker), the output process is the transactions
flow on the platform and the contract depends on the realized transactions flow. Several
economics papers have investigated this kind of problems by identifying it with a Stack-
elberg equilibrium between the two parties. More precisely, since the principal cannot
control the work of the agent, she anticipates his best response to a given compensation.
We follow the stream of literature initiated in [16]. Then in [30], the author recasts such
issue into a stochastic control problem which has been further developed using backward
stochastic differential equation theory in [8]. See also [9] for related literature.
This paper provides a quasi-explicit expression for the optimal contract between the ex-
change and the market maker, and for the market maker optimal quotes. The optimal
contract depends essentially on the market maker inventory trajectory and on the volatil-
ity of the market. These simple formulas enable us to analyze in details the effects for the
welfare of the market of optimal contracting with an exchange, compared to a situation
without contract as in [3, 13]. We show that such contracts lead to reduced spreads and
lower trading costs for investors. We also propose an extension of this work to an oligopoly
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of symmetric exchanges aiming et hiring a single market marker. We show in particular
that there exists a unique Markovian symmetric Nash equilibrium for the exchanges.
The paper is organized as follows. Our modeling approach is presented in Section 2. In
particular, we define the market maker’s as well as the exchange’s optimization framework.
In Section 3, we compute the best response of the market maker for a given contract.
Optimal contracts are designed in Section 4 where we solve the exchange’s problem. Then,
in Section 5, we assess the benefits for market quality of the presence of an exchange
contracting optimally with a market maker. In Section 6, we extend our study to an
oligopoly of symmetric exchanges. Finally, useful technical results are gathered in an
appendix together with the so-called first best case (see Appendix A.7) which provides
different solutions.
2 The model
Our starting point is the seminal work of Avellaneda & Stoikov [3]. Our objective is to
derive optimal make-take fees in order to monitor the behavior of a market maker on a
platform acting according to the optimal market making model of [3].
2.1 Contractible and observable variables
Let T > 0 be a final horizon time, Ωc the set of continuous functions from [0, T ] into R, Ωd
the set of piecewise constant ca`dla`g functions from [0, T ] into N, and Ω = Ωc× (Ωd)2 with
corresponding Borel algebra F . The observable state is the canonical process (χt)t∈[0,T ] =
(St, N
a
t , N
b
t )t∈[0,T ] of the measurable space (Ω,F):
St(ω) := s(t), N
a
t (ω) := n
a(t), N bt (ω) := n
b(t), for all t ∈ [0, T ], ω = (s, na, nb) ∈ Ω,
with canonical completed filtration F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ] = (F ct ⊗ (Fdt )⊗2)t∈[0,T ].
The trading activity is reduced to a single risky asset S with observable efficient price S
defined by:1
St := S0 + σWt, t ∈ [0, T ], (1)
for some Brownian motion W , initial price S0 > 0, and constant volatility σ > 0. The
market maker chooses processes denoted by δb and δa respectively so as to fix publicly
1In practice, the efficient price can be thought of as the mid-price of the asset, see [29, 11].
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available bid and ask offer prices:
P bt := St − δbt and P at := St + δat , t ∈ [0, T ].
The arrival of bid and ask market orders is modeled by a counting process (N b, Na) with
unit jumps, so that no more than one market order can occur at each time. We introduce
the inventory process of the market maker Q:
Qt := N
b
t −Nat ∈ N ∩
[− q¯, q¯], t ∈ [0, T ],
where N b0 = N
a
0 = 0 and, as in [13], we impose a critical absolute inventory q¯ ∈ N above
which the market maker stops quoting on the ask or bid side.
Let c > 0 be the fee collected by the exchange, see Section 2.3 below. In order to
illustrate the impact of the posted prices on the transactions arrival process (N b, Na), the
corresponding intensity process depends on the departure of the transaction price from
the efficient price, i.e. c+ δit, i ∈ {b, a}, as follows:
λi,δt := λ(δ
i
t)1I{εiQt>−q¯}, i ∈ {b, a}, (εb, εa) = (−1, 1), with λ(x) := Ae−k
(x+c)
σ , (2)
for some fixed positive constants A and k, and with dependence on the volatility param-
eter σ so as to reproduce the stylized fact that the average number of trades per unit
of time is a decreasing function of the ratio between the spread and the volatility, see
[10, 21, 33].
Our canonical variables being S, Na and N b, the contracts are allowed to depend on the
trajectories of these quantities only: these are our three contractible variables. This is
actually very reasonable: the efficient price is a quantity any market participant is used
to, whether the chosen proxy for it is the midprice, the last traded price or some volume
weighted price. The processes Na and N b encode the arrivals of market orders and there-
fore actual transactions, which are clearly recorded on any exchange and accessible to
most participants. So the contracts will be designed on standard, unarguable and easily
obtained financial variables.
Note that the spreads δa and δb are here observable by market takers, but not contractible.
From the exchange viewpoint, it would not be reasonable to introduce the spread variable
in a contract. First, quotes are typically not recorded with the same degree of accuracy as
transactions since they are evolving on a much higher frequency, which can sometimes be of
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the order of the millisecond. Second, quoted prices do not in general lead to transactions
and it would be probably hard to justify taxing or subsidizing agents based on offer
prices having no tangible counterparts. Finally, a quote based contract would certainly
encourage high frequency traders to attempt exploiting possible flaws in the contract,
using for example a very high rate of cancellations of their orders, leading to possible
market disruptions, see [1, 24] for studies about high frequency traders behavior.
2.2 Admissible controls and market maker’s problem
The set of admissible controls A is the collection of all predictable processes δ = (δa, δb)
uniformly bounded by δ∞, some sufficiently large positive constant to be fixed later.
Controlling δ is equivalent to control the arrival intensity of market orders since it is a
deterministic function of the spread. Viewing the market maker optimization problem this
way, we see that the intensity plays the very same role as the drift in standard principal-
agent problems where the agent controls the drift of a diffusion process, this drift being
unobserved by the principal, see [30, 8]. A particular feature of our modelling is that
the intensity is observable (although non-contractible) because of its connexion with the
spread. However, the spread is in some sense an artificial variable here enabling us to fit
with market reality (the market maker has access in practice to the spread but not to the
intensity of market takers arrivals). Each control process δ induces
– the market maker profit and loss process:
PLδt := X
δ
t +QtSt, where X
δ
t :=
∫ t
0
P ar dN
a
r −
∫ t
0
P br dN
b
r , t ∈ [0, T ], (3)
as the sum of the cash flow Xδ and the inventory risk2 QS,
– and a probability measure Pδ under which S is driven by (1), and
N˜ i,δt := N
i
t −
∫ t
0
λi,δr dr, t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ {b, a}, are martingales.
Then, Pδ is defined by the density dPδ
dP0
∣∣
FT = L
δ
T , induced by the Dole´ans-Dade exponential
2As in [3], for sake of simplicity, we assume that the market maker estimates his inventory risk using
the efficient price S.
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martingale dLδt = L
δ
t−
∑
i=b,a 1I{εiQt−>−q¯}
λ(δit)−A
A
dN˜ i,0t , i.e.
3 again with (εb, εa) = (−1, 1),
Lδt := exp
∑
i=b,a
∫ t
0
1I{εiQr−>−q¯}
[
log
(λ(δir)
A
)
dN ir − (λ(δir)− A)dr
]
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (4)
In particular, all probability measures Pδ are equivalent. We therefore use the notation
a.s for almost surely without ambiguity. We shall write Eδt for the conditional expectation
with respect to Ft with probability measure Pδ.
The exchange aims at encouraging the market maker to reduce his spread so as to enhance
market liquidity on the platform. This is achieved by setting the terms of an incentive con-
tract defined by an FT -measurable random variable ξ. In other words, the compensation
ξ may depend on the whole paths of the contractible variables Na, N b and S. Given this
additional revenue, the market maker’s objective is defined by the utility maximization
problem
VMM(ξ) := sup
δ∈A
JMM(δ, ξ), where JMM(δ, ξ) := Eδ
[
− e−γ(ξ+PLδT )
]
(5)
= Eδ
[
− e−γ(ξ+
∫ T
0 δ
a
t dN
a
t +δ
b
tdN
b
t+QtdSt)
]
.
Here, γ > 0 is the absolute risk aversion parameter of the CARA market maker. For
each compensation ξ, we shall prove below that there exists a unique optimal response
δˆ(ξ) = (δˆb(ξ), δˆa(ξ)) ∈ A of the market marker, i.e. VMM(ξ) = JMM
(
δˆ(ξ), ξ
)
.
Remark 2.1. When there is no incentive payment ξ = 0, the utility maximization problem
(5) reduces to the Avellaneda & Stoikov [3, 13] optimal market making problem.
2.3 The exchange optimal contracting problem
The exchange receives a fixed fee c > 0 for each market order that occurs in the market4,
and then collects at time T the total revenue c(NaT +N
b
T )− ξ. The choice of the contract
ξ is dictated by the utility maximization problem
V E0 := sup
ξ∈C
Eδˆ(ξ)
[
− e−η(c(NaT+NbT )−ξ)
]
, (6)
3see e.g. Theorem III.3.11 in [18]; the uniform boundedness of δ guarantees that Lδ is a martingale,
see [32].
4In practice, some exchanges add to this fixed fee a component which is proportional to the traded
cash amount. Our analysis can be extended to more elaborated fee schedules. Our choice of a constant
fee is motivated by the induced simplicity which will be crucial to derive our quasi-explicit solution.
Furthermore, we will in fact see that when using the optimal contract, the exchange is somehow indifferent
to the value of c, see Section 4.2.3.
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where η > 0 is the exchange’s absolute risk aversion parameter, and the set of admissible
contracts C is the collection of all contracts satisfying
– the participation constraint VMM(ξ) ≥ R, where the reservation level R < 0 may be
chosen to be the utility level without contract,
– together with the integrability conditions:
sup
δ∈A
Eδ
[
eη
′ξ
]
<∞ and sup
δ∈A
Eδ
[
e−γ
′ξ
]
<∞, for some η′ > η, γ′ > γ. (7)
Since Na and N b are point processes with bounded intensities, and the inventory pro-
cess Q is bounded, it follows from an easy application of the Ho¨lder inequality that the
expectations in both problems (5) and (6) are finite.
We assume throughout this paper that the participation level R is so that the set of
admissible contracts is non-empty:
C =
{
ξ, FT -measurable such that VMM(ξ) ≥ R and (7) is satisfied
}
6= ∅.
3 Solving the market maker’s problem
We start by solving the problem (5) of the market maker facing an arbitrary contract
ξ ∈ C proposed by the exchange.
3.1 Market maker’s optimal response
For (δ, z, q) ∈ [−δ∞, δ∞]2 × R3 × Z, with δ = (δa, δb) and z = (zS, za, zb), we define
h(δ, z, q) :=
∑
i=b,a
1− e−γ(zi+δi)
γ
λ(δi)1I{εiq>−q¯} and H(z, q) := sup
|δa|∨|δb|≤δ∞
h(δ, z, q).
with (εb, εa) = (−1, 1). For an arbitrary constant Y0 ∈ R and predictable processes
Z = (ZS, Za, Zb), with
∫ T
0
(|ZSt |2 + |H(Zt, Qt)|)dt <∞, we introduce the process
Y Y0,Zt = Y0 +
∫ t
0
Zar dN
a
r + Z
b
rdN
b
r + Z
S
r dSr +
(1
2
γσ2(ZSr +Qr)
2 −H(Zr, Qr)
)
dr, (8)
and we denote by Z the collection of all such processes Z such that the first integrability
condition in (7) is satisfied with ξ = Y 0,ZT and
sup
δ∈A
sup
t∈[0,T ]
Eδ[e−γ′Y
0,Z
t ] <∞, for some γ′ > γ. (9)
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Clearly, Z 6= ∅ as it contains all bounded predictable processes and
C ⊃ Ξ := {Y Y0,ZT : Y0 ∈ R, Z ∈ Z, and VMM(Y Y0,ZT ) ≥ R}.
The next result shows that these sets are in fact equal, and identifies the market maker
utility value and the corresponding optimal response. To prove equality of these sets, we
are reduced to the problem of representing any contract ξ ∈ C as ξ = Y Y0,ZT for some
(Y0, Z) ∈ R × Z, which is known in the literature as a problem of backward stochastic
differential equation. We refrain from using this terminology, as our analysis does not
require any result from this literature.
Theorem 3.1. (i) Any contract ξ ∈ C has a unique representation as ξ = Y Y0,ZT , for some
(Y0, Z) ∈ R×Z. In particular, C = Ξ.
(ii) Under this representation, the market maker utility value is
VMM
(
ξ
)
= −e−γY0 , so that Ξ =
{
Y Y0,ZT : Z ∈ Z, and Y0 ≥ Yˆ0
}
, Yˆ0 := −1
γ
log(−R),
with the following optimal bid-ask policy
δˆit(ξ) = ∆(Z
i
t), i ∈ {b, a}, where ∆(z) := (−δ∞) ∨
{
− z + 1
γ
log
(
1 +
σγ
k
)}
∧ δ∞. (10)
The proof of Part (i) is reported in Section A.4, and is obtained by using the dynamic
continuation utility process of the market maker, following the approach of Sannikov [30].
Proof of Theorem 3.1 (ii) Let ξ = Y Y0,ZT with (Y0, Z) ∈ R × Z. We first prove that
JMM(δ, ξ) ≤ −e−γY0 for all δ ∈ A. Denote Y t := Y Y0,Zt +
∑
i=a,b
∫ t
0
δitdN
i
t +QtdSt. Setting
hδ := h(δ, .), it follows from Itoˆ’s formula that
de−γY t = γe−γY t−
[
− (Qt + ZSt )dSt −
∑
i=b,a
1− e−γ(Zit+δit)
γ
dN˜ i,δt +
(
H − hδt)(Zt, Qt)dt],
implying that e−γY is a Pδ-local submartingale. By Condition (9), the uniform bound-
edness of the intensities of Na and N b and Ho¨lder inequality, (e−γY t)t∈[0,T ] is uniformly
integrable. By Doob-Meyer decomposition theorem, we conclude that
∫ ·
0
γe−γY t−
(−(Qt+
ZSt )dSt −
∑
i=b,a
1−e−γ(Zit+δit)
γ
dN˜ i,δt
)
, is a martingale. It follows that
JMM(δ, ξ) = Eδ
[−e−γY T ] = −e−γY0−Eδ[ ∫ T
0
γe−γY t
(
H(Zt, Qt)−h(δt, Zt, Qt)
)
dt
]
≤ −e−γY0 .
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On the other hand, equality holds in the last inequality if and only if δ is chosen as the
maximizer of the Hamiltonian H (dt × dP0−a.e.), thus leading to the unique maximizer
δˆ(ξ) given by (10), which then induces JMM(δˆ(ξ), ξ) = −e−γY0 . This completes the proof
that VMM(ξ) = −e−γY0 with optimal response δˆ(ξ).
4 Designing the optimal contract
4.1 Risk-neutral exchange as a toy example.
To understand the shape of the optimal contract, we first study the case where the ex-
change is risk neutral, corresponding to the limit where η goes to 0 for which we can
derive the optimal compensation with explicit computations. In the present setting, we
set q = +∞, thus relaxing the boundedness restriction on the inventory. By Theorem
3.1, the problem of the exchange reduces to
V E0 = sup
Y0≥Yˆ0
sup
Z∈Z
Eδˆ(Y
Y0,Z
T )
[
c(NaT +N
b
T )− Y Y0,ZT
]
= sup
Z∈Z
Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Z
T )
[
c(NaT +N
b
T )− Y Yˆ0,ZT
]
,(11)
with δˆit = ∆(Z
i
t), t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ {a, b}, and where the maximization over Y0 is achieved at
Yˆ0, due to the fact that the market maker optimal response δˆ(Y
Y0,Z
T ), given by (10), does
not depend on Y0 so that the objective function is decreasing in Y0.
Theorem 4.1. Consider the risk neutral exchange case η ↘ 0, and assume δ∞ ≥ σk −
σ
k+σγ
+ 1
γ
log(1 + σγ
k
)− c. Then the optimal contract for the exchange problem (11) is:
ξˆ = Yˆ0 + c(N
a
T +N
b
T )−
∫ T
0
QrdSr − σT
k + σγ
, (12)
with optimal market maker effort:
δˆat (ξˆ) = δˆ
b
t (ξˆ) =
σ
k
− σ
k + σγ
+
1
γ
log(1 +
σγ
k
)− c.
Proof. By setting c˜ = c+ σ
k+σγ
, note that
Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Z
T )
[
c
∑
i=b,a
N iT−Y Yˆ0,ZT
]
= Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Z
T )
[ ∫ T
0
∑
i=b,a
λ(δˆit)(c˜−Zit)dt−Yˆ0−
∫ T
0
(1
2
γσ2(ZSr +Qr)
2
)
dr
]
,
so that the optimizer in (11) are given by ZS,?r = −Qr, Za,?r = Zb,?r = c˜− σk .
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Note that the optimal contract given by (12) emphasizes a risk transfer between the payoff
of the market maker and that of the exchange through the term
∫ T
0
QrdSr.
4.2 Exponential risk averse exchange
By Theorem 3.1, and solving the maximization with respect to Y0 ≥ Yˆ0 as in the previous
subsection, the exchange problem (6) reduces to
V E0 = e
ηYˆ0 vE0 , where v
E
0 := sup
Z∈Z
Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Z
T )
[
− e−η
(
c(NaT+N
b
T )−Y 0,ZT
)]
. (13)
4.2.1 The HJB equation for the reduced exchange problem
Our approach for the control problem vE0 of (13) is to derive a solution v of the correspond-
ing HJB equation, and to proceed by the standard verification argument in stochastic
control to prove that the proposed solution v coincides with the value function vE0 .
By the standard dynamic programming approach, the HJB equation for (13) is
∂tv(t, q)+HE
(
q, v(t, q), v(t, q+1), v(t, q−1)) = 0, q ∈ {−q¯, · · · , q¯}, t ∈ [0, T ), (14)
with boundary condition v
∣∣
t=T
= −1, with Hamiltonian HE : [−q¯, q¯]× (−∞, 0]3 → R:
HE(q, y, y+, y−) = H1E(q, y) + 1I{q>−q¯}H
0
E(y, y−) + 1I{q<q¯}H
0
E(y, y+), (15)
and
H1E(q, y) = sup
zs∈R
h1E(q, y, zs), and h
1
E(q, y, zs) =
ησ2
2
y
(
γ(zs + q)
2 + ηz2s
)
,
H0E(y, y
′) = sup
ζ∈R
h0E(y, y
′, ζ) and h0E(y, y
′, ζ) = λ
(
∆(ζ)
)[
y′eη(ζ−c) − y(1 + η 1− e−γ(ζ+∆(ζ))
γ
)]
.
By Lemma A.2 below, the maximizers zˆ = (zˆs, zˆa, zˆb) of HE are given by:
zˆs(t, q) = − γ
γ+η
q, zˆa(t, q) = ζˆ
(
v(t, q), v(t, q − 1)), zˆb(t, q) = ζˆ(v(t, q), v(t, q + 1)), (16)
with ζˆ(y, y′) = ζ0 +
1
η
log
( y
y′
)
, ζ0 = c+
1
η
log
(
1− σ
2γη
(k + σγ)(k + ση)
)
.
Here, δ∞ is sufficiently large so that Condition (38) of Lemma A.2 is always met, namely
δ∞ ≥ C∞ + 1
η
sup
t∈[0,T ]
sup
q∈[−q¯,q¯−1]
∣∣∣∣log( v(t, q)v(t, q + 1)
)∣∣∣∣ , (17)
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with C∞ given in Lemma A.2, and we shall check in our verification argument that our
candidate solution of the HJB equation will verify it. Using again the calculation reported
in Lemma A.2, we rewrite the HJB equation (14) as
∂tv(t, q)+
γη2σ2
2(γ + η)
q2v(t, q)−C0v(t, q)
[
1I{q>−q¯}
( v(t, q)
v(t, q − 1)
) k
ση+1I{q<q¯}
( v(t, q)
v(t, q + 1)
) k
ση
]
= 0,
(18)
with boundary condition v
∣∣
t=T
= −1, where the constant C0 is given by
C0 = C0(
σγ
k
,
ση
k
), with C0(α, β) := Aβ(1 + α)
− 1
α
(
1− αβ
(1 + α)(1 + β)
)1+ 1
β
.
Inspired by [13], we now make the key observation that this equation can be reduced to
a linear equation by introducing u := (−v)− kση . By direct substitution, we obtain the
following linear differential equation
u
∣∣
t=T
= 1, and ∂tu(t, q)−FC1,C′1(q, u(t, q), u(t, q+1), u(t, q−1)) = 0, t < T, |q| ≤ q¯, (19)
Fm,m′(q, y, y
′, y′′) := mq2y −m′(y′1I{q<q¯} + y′′1I{q>−q¯}), C1 := kγησ
2(γ + η)
, C ′1 :=
kC0
ση
.
This equation can be written in terms of the R2q¯+1−valued function u(t) = (u(t, q))
q∈{−q¯,...,q¯},
of the variable t only, as the linear ordinary differential equation
∂tu = −Bu, where B =

−C1q¯2 C′1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
C′1 −C1q2 C′1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
C′1 −C1q¯2
← q-th line,
is a tri-diagonal matrix with lines labelled −q¯, . . . , q¯. Denote by bq the vector of R2q¯+1
with zeros everywhere except at the position q, i.e. bq,j = 1I{j=q} for j ∈ {−q¯, . . . , q¯}, and
1 =
∑q¯
q=−q¯ bq. Then, this ODE has a unique solution
u(t) = e(T−t)B1, so that u(t, q) = bq ·e(T−t)B1, and v(t, q) = −
(
bq ·e(T−t)B1
)−ση
k . (20)
In the next section, we shall prove that this solution v of the HJB equation (14) coincides
with the value function of the reduced exchange problem (13), with optimal controls zˆ(t, q)
given in (16), thus inducing the optimal contract Y Yˆ0,ZˆT with Zˆt = zˆ(t, Qt−).
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Let us notice that we may provide a more explicit expression of the above function u:
u(t, q) =
∑
p≥0
[C ′1(T − t)]p
p!
∑
j≥0
[C ′1(T − t)]j
j!
e−C1(T−t)(q+j−p)
2
1I{|q+j−p|≤q¯}, (21)
see Appendix A.3 for the more general case ofN symmetric exchanges in Nash equilibrium.
We conclude this section by an (yet one more) alternative representation of the function
u, which is convenient for the derivation of some useful properties.
Proposition 4.1. Let u and v be defined by (20). The function u can be represented as
u(t, q) = E
[
e
∫ T
t (−C1(Qt,qs )2+λs+λs)ds
]
,
where Qt,qs = q +
∫ s
t
d(Nu − Nu), and (N,N) is a two-dimensional point process with
intensity (λs, λs) = C
′
1(1I{Qs−<q¯}, 1I{Qs−>−q¯}). In particular, we have e
−C1q¯2T ≤ u ≤ e2C′1T ,
and Condition (17) is verified whenever
δ∞ ≥ ∆∞ := C∞ + σ
k
(2C ′1 + C1q¯
2)T. (22)
Proof. Notice that u is a smooth bounded function. Denote f(x) = −C1x2 +C ′1(1I{x>−q¯}+
1I{x<q¯}), and Ms = e
∫ s
t f(Q
t,q
u )duu(s,Qt,qs ), t ≤ s ≤ T . We now show that M is a martingale,
so that u(t, q) = Mt = E[MT ] = E
[
e−
∫ T
t f(Q
t,q
s )ds
]
, as u(T, .) = 1. To see that M is a
martingale, we compute by Itoˆ’s formula that
dMs =
[
u(s,Qt,qs )f(Q
t,q
s ) + ∂tu(s,Q
t,q
s )
]
ds
+C ′1
[
u(s,Qt,qs− + 1)− u(s,Qt,qs−)
]
dN s + C
′
1
[
u(s,Qt,qs− − 1)− u(s,Qt,qs−)
]
dN s.
Since u is solution of (19), we get
dMs = C
′
1
[
u(s,Qt,qs− + 1)− u(s,Qt,qs−)
]
dM s + C
′
1
[
u(s,Qt,qs− − 1)− u(s,Qt,qs−)
]
dM s,
where (M,M) = (N − ∫ ·
0
λsds,N −
∫ ·
0
λsds) is a martingale. The martingale property of
M now follows from the boundedness of u as it can be verified from the expression (20).
Finally, the bound |Qt,qs | ≤ q¯ induces directly the announced bounds on u, which in turn
imply Condition (17) when (22) is satisfied because v = −u−σηk .
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4.2.2 Main result
We now verify that the function v derived in the previous section is the value function of
the exchange, with optimal feedback controls (zˆs, zˆa, zˆb) as given in (16), thus identifying
a unique optimal contract to be proposed by the exchange to the market maker.
Theorem 4.2. Assume that δ∞ ≥ ∆∞, with ∆∞ given by (22) and define u and v by
(20). Then the optimal contract for the problem of the exchange (6) is given by
ξˆ = Yˆ0 +
∫ T
0
Zˆar dN
a
r + Zˆ
b
rdN
b
r + Zˆ
S
r dSr +
(1
2
γσ2
(
ZˆSr +Qr
)2 −H(Zˆr, Qr))dr, (23)
with ZˆSr = zˆ
s(r,Qr−), Zˆar = zˆ
a(r,Qr−), and Zˆbr = zˆ
b(r,Qr−) as defined in (16). The
market maker’s optimal effort is given by
δˆat = δˆ
a
t (ξˆ) = −Zˆat +
1
γ
log(1 +
σγ
k
), δˆbt = δˆ
b
t (ξˆ) = −Zˆbt +
1
γ
log(1 +
σγ
k
). (24)
Remark 4.1. Notice that, in our model the exchange observes the spread set by the
market maker. However, as explained above, the spread cannot be part of the contract.
Consequently, the second best exchange problem in Theorem 4.2 does not coincide with
the first best where the exchange could use the observe bid-ask policy δ in the contract
ξ, under the market maker participation constraint. The corresponding computations are
reported in Appendix A.7 below.
4.2.3 Discussions and interpretations
The processes Zˆa, Zˆb and ZˆS defining the optimal contract have natural interpretations.
Based on Proposition 4.1, we can get the intuition that (at least for large inventories)
Zˆi = ξ0 +
1
η
log
( u(t, Qt−)
u(t, Qt− − εi)
)
∼
|q|→+∞
ξ0 +
εi
η
C1
k
Qt−, i ∈ {a, b}, (25)
recalling that (εb, εa) = (−1, 1). This is confirmed in our Figure 4 below at time t = 0
(since Zˆb and Zˆa are the opposite of the optimal bid and ask spreads respectively). This is
in fact shown for any time in the numerical simulations and asymptotic expansion in [13,
Section 4] and [3, Section 3.2] where same type of PDE as ours is considered. Thus, when
the inventory is highly positive, the exchange provides incentives to the market-maker so
that it attracts buy market orders and discourage him from more sell market orders, and
vice versa for a negative inventory. The integral
∫ T
0
ZˆSr dSr can be understood as a risk
sharing term. More precisely,
∫ t
0
QrdSr corresponds to the price driven component of the
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inventory risk QtSt. Hence, the exchange supports the proportion
γ
γ+η
of this risk so that
the market maker maintains reasonable quotes despite some inventory.
Notice that for a highly risk averse exchange, i.e. η ↗∞,∫ T
0
Zˆar dN
a
r + Zˆ
b
rdN
b
r ≈ c(NaT +N bT ), ZˆSr ≈ 0,
meaning that the exchange transfers to the market maker the total fee. This is the so-
called selling the firm effect, as the exchange delegates all benefit to the market maker.5
Until now, we have focused on the maker part of the make-take fees problem since we
have considered that the taker cost c is fixed. Nevertheless, our approach also enables
us to suggest the exchange a relevant value for c. Actually, we see that when acting
optimally, the exchange transfers the totality of the fixed taker fee c to the market maker.
It is therefore neutral to the value of c as its optimal utility function vE0 = v(0, Q0) is
independent of the taker cost, see (18). However, c plays an important role in the optimal
spread offered by the market maker given by
−2c+ σ
k
log
( u(t, Qt−)2
u(t, Qt− − 1)u(t, Qt− + 1)
)
− 2
η
log
(
1− σ
2γη
(k + σγ)(k + ση)
)
+
2
γ
log(1+
σγ
k
).
Furthermore, from numerical computations6 or the asymptotic development (25), we re-
mark that u(t,q)
2
u(t,q−1)u(t,q+1) is close to unity for any t and q. Hence if for example the exchange
targets a spread close to one tick (see [10, 17] for details on optimal tick sizes and spreads),
it can be obtained by setting
c ≈ −1
2
Tick− 1
η
log
(
1− σ
2γη
(k + σγ)(k + ση)
)
+
1
γ
log(1 +
σγ
k
).
For σγ/k small enough, this equation reduces to
c ≈ σ
k
− 1
2
Tick. (26)
This is a particularly simple formula for setting the taker constant fee c, as the parameters
σ and k can be easily estimated from market data. We see that the higher the volatility,
the larger the taker cost should be. The decrease in k is also natural: If k is large, the
liquidity vanishes rapidly when the spread becomes wide, meaning that market takers are
sensitive to extra costs relative to the efficient price. Therefore, the taker cost has to be
5We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this interpretation.
6See indeed Figure 2 by noting that u does not depend on the fee c.
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small if the exchange wants to maintain a reasonable market order flow.
5 Exchange impact on market quality
In this section, we compare our setting with the situation without incentive policy from an
exchange towards market making activities which corresponds to the problem of optimal
market making considered in [3, 13]. The results in [3] are taken as benchmark for our
investigation to emphasize the impact of the incentive policy on market quality. We will
refer to this case as the neutral exchange case.
Let us first recall the results in [3, 13]. The optimal controls of the market maker denoted
by δ˜a and δ˜b are given as a function of the inventory Qt by
δ˜it =
σ
k
log
( u˜(t, Qt−)
u˜(t, Qt− − εi)
)
+
1
γ
log(1 +
σγ
k
), i ∈ {b, a}, (εb, εa) = (−1, 1),
where u˜ is the unique solution of the linear differential equation
u˜
∣∣
t=T
= 1 and ∂tu˜(t, q)− FC˜1,C˜′1(q, u˜(t, q), u˜(t, q + 1), u˜(t, q − 1)) = 0, t < T, |q| ≤ q¯,
with C˜1 =
σγk
2
and C˜ ′1 = A(1 +
σγ
k
)−(1+
σγ
k
). In our case, the optimal quotes δˆa and δˆb are
obtained from Theorem 4.2 and satisfy for i ∈ {b, a}, and (εb, εa) = (−1, 1):
δˆit =
σ
k
log
( u(t, Qt−)
u(t, Qt− − εi)
)
+
1
γ
log(1 +
σγ
k
)− c− 1
η
log
(
1− σ
2γη
(k + σγ)(k + ση)
)
.
where u is solution of the linear equation (19).
Numerical experiments show that u and u˜ decrease quickly to zero when q becomes large,
inducing numerical instabilities in the computation of
v+(t, q) = log
(u(t, q + 1)
u(t, q)
)
, v˜+(t, q) = log
( u˜(t, q + 1)
u˜(t, q)
)
, q ∈ {−q¯, · · · , q¯ − 1},
which are crucial in the expressions of optimal quotes. To circumvent this numerical
difficulty, we remark that v+ and v˜+ are solution of the following integro-differential
equations
v+
∣∣
t=T
= 0 and ∂tv+(t, q) + FC1,C′1(q, v+(t, q), v+(t, q + 1), v−(t, q + 1)) = 0, (27)
v˜+
∣∣
t=T
= 0 and ∂tv˜+(t, q) + FC˜1,C˜′1(q, v˜+(t, q), v˜+(t, q + 1), v˜+(t, q − 1)) = 0, (28)
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where, again with (εb, εa) = (−1, 1),
Fα,β(q, y, y+, y−) = α(2q + 1)− β
∑
i∈{a,b}
εie
εiv+(t,q−εi)1I{εiq<q¯−1} − εieεiv+(t,q).
We thus rather apply classical finite difference schemes to (27) and (28).
In the following numerical illustrations, in the spirit of [13, Section 6], we take T = 600s
for an asset with volatility σ = 0.3 Tick.s−1/2 (unless specified differently). Market orders
arrive according to the intensities (2) with A = 1.5s−1 and k = 0.3s−1/2. We assume that
the threshold inventory of the market maker is q¯ = 50 units and we set his risk aversion
parameter to γ = 0.01. The exchange is taken more risk averse with η = 1. Finally, we
assume that the taker cost c = 0.5 Tick7.
5.1 Impact of the exchange on the spread and market liquidity
We start by comparing the optimal spread δˆa0 + δˆ
b
0 at time 0 obtained when contracting
optimally with the optimal spread δ˜a0 + δ˜
b
0 without contracting. The optimal spreads are
plotted in Figure 1 for different initial inventory values Q0 ∈ {−q¯, · · · , q¯}.
Figure 1: Comparison of optimal initial spreads with/without incentive policy from the exchange.
We observe in Figure 1 that the initial spread does not depend a lot on the initial inven-
tory (because the considered time interval [0, T ] is not too small) and that it is reduced
thanks to the optimal contract between the market maker and the exchange. This is not
surprising since in our case the exchange aims at increasing the market order flow by
proposing an incentive contract to the market maker inducing a spread reduction. Actu-
ally this phenomenon occurs over the whole trading period [0, T ]. To see this, we generate
7Remark that the taker cost is chosen according to Criteria (26). We expect the optimal spread to be
close to one tick. Note also that here the tick is just a unit and not a true market parameter.
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5000 paths of market scenarios and compute the average spread over [0, T ] for an initial
inventory Q0 = 0. The results are given in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Average spread on [0, T ] with 95% confidence interval, with/without incentive.
Since the spread is tighter during the trading period under an incentive policy from the
exchange, the arrival intensity of market orders is more important and hence the market
is more liquid as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Average order flow on [0, T ] with 95% confidence interval, with/without incentive.
We now consider in Figure 4 the bid and ask sides separately. We see that when the
inventory is positive and very large, δˆa and δ˜a are negative, meaning that the market
maker is ready to sell at prices lower than the efficient price in order to attract market
orders and reduce his inventory risk. On the contrary, if the inventory is negative and
very large, in both situations, its ask quotes are well above the efficient price in order to
repulse the arrival of buy market orders. However, since in our case the exchange remu-
nerates the market maker for each arrival of market order, we get that the ask spread with
contract δˆa is smaller than δ˜a. A symmetric conclusion holds for the bid part of the spread.
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Figure 4: Optimal ask and bid spreads, with/without incentive policy.
We now turn to the impact of the volatility on the spread. The optimal contract obtained
in (23) induces an inventory risk sharing phenomenon through the term ZˆS. Hence, when
the volatility increases, the spread difference between situations with/without incentive
policy becomes less important, see Figure 5 in which we consider the optimal initial spread
difference when the initial inventory is set to zero between both situations with/without
incentive policy from the exchange to the market maker for different values of the volatility.
Figure 5: Initial optimal spread difference between the situations with and without incentive.
5.2 Impact on the P&L of the exchange and the market maker
We assume that Q0 = 0. Recall that PL
δ defined in (3) denotes the trading part of
the profit and loss (P&L) of the market maker for a given strategy δ. In our case, the
underlying total P&L at time t of a market maker acting optimally, denoted by PL?t , is:
PL?t = PL
δˆ
t + Y
Yˆ0,Zˆ
t ,
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where Y Yˆ0,Zˆt corresponds to the quantity on the right hand side of (23) with T replaced
by t. We now compare this quantity to the benchmark PLδ˜t which corresponds to the
optimal profit and loss without intervention of the exchange.
To make PL?t and PL
δ˜
t comparable, we choose Yˆ0 in (23) so that the market maker gets
the same utility in both situations, that is Yˆ0 =
k
σ
log(u˜(0, Q0)). Thus, the market maker
is indifferent between the situation with or without exchange intervention. We generate
5000 paths of market scenarios and compare the average of both P&L in Figure 6 with
and without incentive policy.
Figure 6: Average P&L of market maker with/without incentive, with 95% confidence interval.
Since Yˆ0 is set to obtain the same utility in both cases, the two average P&L are very
close at the end of the trading period. The variance of the P&L also seems to be the same
in both situations. The only difference from the market maker viewpoint here is that in
the case of a contract, the P&L is already made at time 0 thanks to the compensation of
the exchange and then fluctuates slightly. This is because he is earning the spread but
paying continuous “coupons”
(
H(Zˆt, Qt) − σ2γ2 (ZˆSt + Qt)2
)
dt from the contract. In the
case without exchange intervention, the market maker increases his P&L over the whole
trading period thanks to the spread.
We now compare the profit and loss of the exchange in the two considered cases. When it
applies an incentive policy towards the market maker, the P&L of the exchange is given
by c(Nat +N
b
t )−Y Yˆ0,Zˆt . When the exchange is neutral, its P&L is simply c(Nat +N bt ). We
compare these two quantities in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Average P&L of the exchange with/without incentive, with 95% confidence interval.
We see that the initial P&L of the contracting exchange is negative because of the initial
payment Yˆ0. However it finally exceeds, with a smaller standard deviation, the P&L in the
situation without incentive policy from the exchange. Hence the incentive policy of the
exchange proves to be successful. Both configurations are indeed equivalent for market
makers but the exchange obtains more revenues when contracting optimally. This is due
to the fact that the contract triggers more market orders.
Finally, we plot the aggregated average P&L of the market maker and the exchange
(independent of the choice of the initial payment). We observe that it is always greater
in the optimal contract case.
Figure 8: P&L of exchange and market maker with/without incentive, 95% confidence interval.
5.3 Impact of the incentive policy on the trading cost
We consider one single market taker. In the case without exchange, with the specified
parameters and under optimal reaction of the market maker, this investor buys on average
200 shares over [0, T ]. To make the comparison with the case with exchange intervention,
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we modify the parameter A appearing in the intensity (2) when simulating a market with
optimal contract. This new value is chosen so that the investor buys on average the same
number of assets (200) over the time period. This amounts to take A = 0.9s−1. We
confirm in Figure 9 that the average ask order flows agree in both situations.
Figure 9: Setting similar average ask order flows on [0, T ] by taking different intensity basis A
in the case with and in the case without incentive policy; 95% confidence interval.
Finally, Figure 10 compares the average cost of trading for the market taker Eδ
[ ∫ T
0
δat dN
a
t
]
,
with and without incentive, and shows that the reduced spreads lead to significantly
smaller trading costs for investors.
Figure 10: Average trading cost on [0, T ] with 95% confidence interval, with/without incentive.
6 Extension: symmetric exchanges competition
In this section we extend the previous study by considering a first step towards the
investigation of the case of several exchanges in competition.
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6.1 Symmetric exchanges in Nash equilibrium
We assume here that N identical exchanges display the quotes of one market maker and
that the trading flows are split equally between the exchanges. More precisely, each
time the market taker acts on the market, his trade of size one is split into N trades of
size 1/N distributed across all exchanges. This is equivalent to modify the market taker
fee received by each exchange from c to c/N . This situation is of course quite stylized
but understanding it is obviously a very important preliminary to the study of the case
of different exchanges with various market makers. Furthermore, as we will see below,
the situation considered here is already significantly more intricate than the case of one
exchange treated in the previous sections.
The market maker receives the aggregation of the compensation given by the N exchanges
denoted by ξ = ξ + ξ˜, where ξ and ξ˜ are repsectively the remuneration given by a
representative exchange and the aggregation of the N −1 others. Hence, ξ inherits all the
technical assumptions made previously on ξ (for only one exchange), since the problem
of the market maker is similar by considering ξ for his compensation. Consequently, the
market maker’s problem returns an optimal spread δˆ(ξ) so that Theorem 3.1 holds by
considering ξ. In view of the symmetry assumption made on the exchanges, any exchange
aims at solving
V E0 (ξ˜) = sup
ξ∈C
Eδˆ(ξ+ξ˜)
[
− e−η( cN (NaT+NbT )−ξ)
]
, (29)
where ξ˜ is fixed, and η > 0 is the common risk aversion parameter of the N exchanges.
Definition 6.1 (Nash equilibrium and symmetric Nash equilibrium). A N-tuple (ξe)1≤e≤N
is a Nash equilibrium if for any e ∈ {1, . . . , N} we have
V E0 (ξ
e) = Eδˆ(
∑N
j=1 ξ
j
)
[
− e−η( cN (NaT+NbT )−ξe)
]
.
A N-tuple of contracts (ξe)1≤e≤N is a symmetric Nash equilibrium if (ξe)1≤e≤N is a Nash
equilibrium such that ξ1 = · · · = ξN . We denote by SN := {ξ0 : (ξ0, . . . , ξ0) ∈ CN} the
collection of all such symmetric Nash equilibria.
From Theorem 3.1, it follows that any symmetric Nash equilibrium ξ0 ∈ SN is induced
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by a pair (y˜0, Z˜) ∈ [Yˆ0,+∞)×Z such that
ξ0 =
1
N
Y y˜0,Z˜T =
y˜0
N
+
∫ T
0
1
N
Z˜rdχr +
γσ2
2N
(Z˜Sr +Qr)
2dr − 1
N
∑
i = a,b
H i(Z˜ir, Qr)dr,
=
y˜0
N
+
∫ T
0
ζ0rdχr +
γσ2
2N
(NζS,0r +Qr)
2dr − 1
N
∑
i=a,b
H i(Nζ i,0r , Qr)dr, (30)
with ζ0 = Z˜
N
, and
H i(z, q) = λ(δˆ(z))
σ
k + σγ
1εiq<Q, with (εb, εa) = (−1, 1).
We now denote by ξ0,N−1 the (N − 1)-tuple of identical contracts ξ0 defined by (30), and
we set Y˜0 :=
N−1
N
y˜0. As ξ+ (N −1)ξ0 = Y Y0+Y˜0,ZT , by setting ζ := Z− (N −1)ζ0, for some
(Y0, Z) ∈ [Yˆ0,+∞)×Z the problem of each exchange reduces to
V E0 (ξ
0,N−1) = sup
Y0,ζ
Eδˆ(ζ+(N−1)ζ0)
[
− e
−η(∫ T0 ( ∑
i=a,b
( c
N
−ζit)dN it−ζSt dSt)−Y0−
∫ T
0 G(ζt,ζ
0
t ,Qt)−α0tdt)]
,
where Y0 ranges in [Yˆ0 − Y˜0,+∞), ζ ∈ Z, and
G(ζ, ζ0, q) = 1
2
γσ2(ζS + (N − 1)ζS,0 + q)2 − ∑
i=a,b
H i(ζ i + (N − 1)ζ i,0, q),
α0t =
N−1
N
(
1
2
γσ2(NζS,0t +Qt)
2 − ∑
i=a,b
H i(Nζ i,0t , Qt)
)
.
The optimization over Y0 is immediately solved, leading to
V E0 (ξ
0,N−1) = sup
ζ∈Z
Eδˆ(ζ+(N−1)ζ0)
[
−e
−η(∫ T0 ( ∑
i=a,b
( c
N
−ζit)dN it−ζSt dSt)−Y ?0 −
∫ T
0 G(ζt,ζ
0
t ,Qt)−α0tdt)]
, (31)
with Y ?0 = Yˆ0 − Y˜0.
Definition 6.2 (Markovian Nash equilibrium). A symmetric Nash equilibrium ξ0 ∈ SN
is Markovian if the coefficients ζ0 appearing in (30) is given by ζ0t = ζ
0(t, Qt) for some
deterministic function ζ0.
Remark 6.1. Note that if ξ0 is a symmetric Nash equilibrium with decomposition (30),
we necessarily have y˜0 = Yˆ0, ζˆ(ζ
0) = ζ0, where ζˆ(ζ0) denotes an optimizer of (31). This
allows to characterize any symmetric Nash equilibrium if there exists at least one.
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6.2 The main result
Similarly to the one exchange problem studied previously, we introduce the HJB equation
v
∣∣
t=T
= −1 and ∂tv(t, q)− ηv(t, q)Fˆ (t, q, v(t, q), v(t, q + 1), v(t, q − 1)) = 0, (32)
with
Fˆ (t, q, y, y+, y−) = sup
ζS
F S(t, q, ζS) + sup
ζ
F 0(t, q, y, y+, ζ)1q<q + sup
ζ
F 0(t, q, y, y−, ζ)1q>−q,
and
F S(t, q, z) = −HˆS(q, ζS,0(q), z)− η
2
σ2|z|2,
F 0(t, q, y, y′, z) = −λ(δˆ(z + (N − 1)ζ˜0(y, y′)))(y′
y
eη(z−
c
N
)
η
− 1
η
− σ
k + σγ
)
−λ(δˆ(Nζ˜0(y, y′))) (N − 1)σ
N(k + σγ)
,
HˆS(q, z˜, z) =
1
2
σ2γ
[
(z + (N − 1)z˜ + q)2 − N − 1
N
(Nz˜ + q)2
]
,
ζS,0(q) = − γ
η +Nγ
q, ζ˜0(y, y′) = ζˆ(y, y′) +
1−N
N
c.
Hence, by denoting ζ̂S, ζ̂N the optimizers of F S and F 0 respectively, we get
ζ̂S(q) = ζS,0(q), ζ̂N(y, y′) = ζ˜0(y, y′).
Consequently, the HJB equation (32) reduces to
∂tv(t, q)+
γη2σ2
2N(Nγ + η)
q2v(t, q)−CˆNv(t, q)
[
1I{q>−q¯}
( v(t, q)
v(t, q − 1)
)Nk
ση +1I{q<q¯}
( v(t, q)
v(t, q + 1)
)Nk
ση
]
= 0,
(33)
with boundary condition v
∣∣
t=T
= −1, where
CˆN = C0e
(N−1)k
ση
σγ + 1
N
(ση + k)
σγ + (ση + k)
.
We now set u = (−v)− kNση . By direct substitution, we obtain the following linear equation
u
∣∣
t=T
= 1 and ∂tu(t, q)− FCN ,C′N (q, u(t, q), u(t, q + 1), u(t, q − 1)) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ), (34)
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with
CN =
kγησ
2(Nγ + η)
and C ′N = CˆN
kN
ση
.
Similarly to Section 4, we deduce that
v(t, q) = −(u(t, q))− σηkN where u(t, q) = bq ·e(T−t)BN1,
and
BN =

−CN q¯2 C′N
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
C′N −CN q2 C′N
. .
.
. .
.
. .
.
C′N −CN q¯2
← q-th line,
Direct calculations reported in Appendix A.3 provide an other form for the function u:
u(t, q) =
∑
p≥0
[C ′N(T − t)]p
p!
∑
j≥0
[C ′N(T − t)]j
j!
e−CN (T−t)(q+j−p)
2
1I{|q+j−p|≤q¯}. (35)
The following result establishes the existence of a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium
which is moreover Markovian. The proof is postponed to Appendix A.6.
Theorem 6.1. There is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium ξ0 ∈ SN defined by
ξ0 =
Ŷ0
N
+
∫ T
0
ζ0rdχr +
γσ2
2N
(NζS,0r +Qr)
2dr − 1
N
∑
i=a,b
H i(Nζ i,0r , Qr)dr, (36)
where, for i ∈ {a, b} and (εb, εa) = (−1, 1),
ζS,0r = −
γ
η +Nγ
Qr, ζ
i,0
r =
c
N
+
1
η
(
log
( v(r,Qr)
v(r,Qr − εi)
)
+ log
(
1− σ
2γη
(ση + k)(σγ + k)
))
.
In particular, this unique symmetric Nash equilibrium is Markovian.
Remark 6.2. There exists infinitely many (non symmetric) Nash equilibria. For instance,
by the contract (ξe)e≤N defined by
ξe = Y j0 +
∫ T
0
ζ0rdχr +
γσ2
N
(NζS,0r +Qr)
2dr − 1
N
∑
i=a,b
H i(Nζ i,0r , Qr)dr,
is a (non symmetric) Nash equilibrium for any Y j0 satisfying
∑N
j=1 Y
j
0 = Yˆ0.
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Remark 6.3. The symmetry of the problem allows us to find a natural candidate for
the equilibrium and by using a verification procedure (see the first step of the proof) we
prove that it is indeed a (symmetric) Nash equilibrium. This follows from the fact that
the integro-differential equation under consideration admits a smooth solution. If now one
wants to extend this study to an heterogeneous oligopoly of exchanges hiring one market
maker, the solution will be strongly linked to a system of fully coupled HJB equation has
explained in [23]. However, the existence of a smooth solution for such a system is not
clear.
6.3 Economic insights
Notice that the total compensationNξ0 obtained by the market maker in theN−symmetric
exchanges situation differs from the optimal contract ξˆ of the one-exchange situation in
(36). Hence, our result is not trivial and worth of interest even in the simple symmetric
exchanges setting in symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Notice that we also have a similar representation of u as in Proposition 4.1:
u(t, q) = E
[
e
∫ T
t (−CN (Qt,qs )2+λs+λs)ds
]
, (37)
where Qt,qs = q+
∫ s
t
d(Nu−Nu), and (N,N) is a two-dimensional point process with inten-
sity (λs, λs) = C
′
N(1I{Qs−<q¯}, 1I{Qs−>−q¯}). By using the same arguments than those in Sec-
tion 4.2.3 (and based on the asymptotic expansion in [3, 13]) we note that Nζbt ∼ −CNk Qt
and Nζat ∼ CNk Qt. Again, when the inventory is highly positive, the exchanges provide
incentives to the market-maker to attract buy market orders and discourage additional
sell market orders, and vice versa for a negative inventory. As CN is decreasing with re-
spect to N , this effect is reduced when the number of platforms increases. Consequently,
from the market maker point of view, the observed spread is reduced when the number
of exchange grows.
Note now that when N becomes large, NζS,0r ∼ −Qr. In other words, for a large number
of platforms, the inventory risk is transferred to the oligopoly of exchanges.
A Appendix
A.1 Predictable representation
The following result is probably well-known, we report it for completeness as we could
not find a precise reference.
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Lemma A.1. Let (Ω,F ,P,F) be a filtered probability space where F = FW∨FN is the right
continuous completed filtration of a Brownian motion W and a d-dimensional integrable
point process N = (N1, · · · , Nd) with compensator A = (A1, · · · , Ad). Then, for any
F−martingale X there exists a predictable process Z = (ZW , Z1, · · · , Zd) such that
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
ZWs dWs +
d∑
i=1
∫ t
0
Zis(dN
i
s − dAis).
Proof. For sake of simplicity, we take d = 1. Let P be a solution of the martingale problem
associated to Mt = Nt − At and Wt. By Theorem III.4.29 in [18], to prove Lemma A.1
we need to establish the uniqueness of P.
We denote by PW the law P conditional on W . We first show that M is still a martingale
under PW . To do so we consider Bs ∈ Fs and want to prove that
EPW
[
1IBs(Mt −Ms)
]
= 0,
for 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T . Let C ∈ FWT . We aim at showing that
E
[
1CEP
W [
1IBs(Mt −Ms)
]]
= E
[
1IC1IBs(Mt −Ms)
]
= 0.
By the martingale representation theorem for Brownian martingales, we can write 1IC =
αs +
∫ T
s
φudWu, where αs = E[1IC |FWs ] and (φu)u≥0 is FW predictable process. Using the
martingale property of M , we obtain
E
[
αs1IBs(Mt −Ms)
]
= 0.
Then W and M being orthogonal martingales, we deduce
E
[ ∫ T
s
φudWu1IBs(Mt −Ms)
]
= 0,
Consequently, using Theorem III.1.21 in [18], PW is the unique probability measure such
that M is an F-martingale conditional on W . Finally, by integration, the uniqueness of
PW implies that of P.
A.2 Exchange Hamiltonian maximization
The following result follows from (tedious) direct calculations.
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Lemma A.2. For all v1, v2 < 0, define
ϕ(z) := Ae−k
∆(z)+c
σ
[
v1e
η(z−c) − v2
(η
γ
(
1− e−γ(z+∆(z)))+ 1)], z ∈ R,
with ∆(z) := (−δ∞) ∨∆0(z) ∧ δ∞ and ∆0(z) := −z + log(1 + σγk )
1
γ , for some parameter
δ∞ satisfying
δ∞ ≥ C∞ +
∣∣ log (v2
v1
) 1
η ∣∣, with C∞ := c+ log (1 + σγk ) 1η+ 1γ(
1− σ2γη
(k+σγ)(k+ση)
) 1
η
. (38)
Then, ϕ has a maximum point z? given by:
z? = c+
1
η
log
( v2
v1
1− σ2γη
(k+σγ)(k+ση)
)
with ϕ(z?) = −Cv2
(v2
v1
) k
ση
,
∣∣∆0(z?)∣∣ ≤ δ∞,
and C = Aση
k
(
1 + σγ
k
)− k
σγ
(
1− σ2γη
(k+σγ)(k+ση)
)1+ k
ση .
A.3 Justification of (21) and (35)
Denote by D and J the matrices defined by the entries Dq,r = q21q=r and J
q,r = 1Ir=q+1 +
1Ir=q+1, −q ≤ p, r ≤ q. Notice that the calculations reported in (21) and (35) reduce to:
U(q) := bq ·
∑
|`|≤q¯
eαJ−βD b`, |q| ≤ q¯, for −q ≤ q ≤ q,
We first compute that
eαJ−βD =
∑
k≥0
(αJ− βD)k
k!
=
∑
k≥0
1
k!
k∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
αj(−β)k−j`2(k−j)Jj
As Jj · b` =
∑j
p=0
(
j
p
)
b`−j+2p, and bq · bq′ = 1I{q=q′}, this provides
bq · eαJ−βDb` =
∑
k≥0
1
k!
k∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
αj(−β)k−j`2(k−j)
j∑
p=0
(
j
p
)
1I{`−j+2p=q}
=
∑
k≥0
k∑
j=0
j∑
p=0
αj(−β`2)k−j
p!(k − j)!(j − p)!1I{`−j+2p=q}
=
∑
p≥0
∑
j≥p
αj
p!(j − p)! e
−β`21I{`=q+j−2p} =
∑
p≥0
∑
j≥0
αj+p
p!j!
e−β`
2
1I{`=q+j−p},
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and we finally conclude that
U(q) =
∑
p≥0
∑
j≥0
αj+p
p!j!
e−β(q+j−p)
2
1I{|q+j−p|≤q¯}, for |q| ≤ q¯.
A.4 Dynamic programming principle and representation
For all F-stopping time τ with values in [t, T ] and for any µ ∈ Aτ , we define8
JT (τ, µ) = Eµτ
[
−e−γ
∫ T
τ (µ
a
udN
a
u+µ
b
udN
b
u+QudSu)e−γξ
]
, and Jτ,T = (JT (τ, µ))µ∈Aτ ,
where Aτ denotes the restriction of A to controls on [τ, T ]. The continuation utility of
the market maker is defined for all F-stopping time τ by
Vτ = ess sup
µ∈Aτ
JT (τ, µ).
Lemma A.3. Let τ be an F-stopping time with values in [t, T ]. Then, there exists a
non-decreasing sequence (µn)n∈N in Aτ such that Vτ = lim
n→+∞
↑ JT (τ, µn).
Proof. For µ and µ′ inAτ , define µˆ = µ1I{JT (τ,µ)≥JT (τ,µ′)}+µ′1I{JT (τ,µ)<JT (τ,µ′)}. Then µˆ ∈ Aτ
and by definition of µˆ, we have JT (τ, µˆ) ≥ max (JT (τ, µ), JT (τ, µ′)) . This shows that Jτ,T
is directly upwards, and the required result folows from [27, Proposition VI.I.I p121].
Lemma A.4. Let t ∈ [0, T ] and τ be an F-stopping time with values in [t, T ]. Then,
Vt = ess sup
δ∈A
Eδt
[
e−γ
∫ τ
t (δu·dNu+QudSu)Vτ
]
.
Proof. We follow the same argument as in [7, Proof of Proposition 6.2]. Denote V˜t the
right hand side of the required equality. First, by the tower property,
Vt = ess sup
δ∈A
Eδt
[
e−γ
∫ τ
t (δu·dNu+QudSu)Eδτ
[
−e−γ(
∫ T
τ (δu·dNu+QudSu)+ξ)
] ]
.
For all δ ∈ A, the quotient LδT
Lδτ
does not depend on the values of δ before time τ . Then,
Eδτ
[
−e−γ(
∫ T
τ (δu·dNu+QudSu)+ξ)
]
= E0τ
[
−L
δ
T
Lδτ
e−γ(
∫ T
τ (δu·dNu+QudSu)+ξ)
]
≤ ess sup
µ∈Aτ
Eµτ
[
−e−γ(
∫ T
τ (µu·dNu+QudSu)+ξ)
]
= Vτ ,
8From (4), notice that for any δ ∈ A, the conditional expectation Eδτ depends only on the restriction
of δ on [τ, T ]. Hence Eµτ is defined without ambiguity for µ ∈ Aτ .
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which implies that Vt ≤ V˜t.
We next prove the reverse inequality. Let δ ∈ A and µ ∈ Aτ . We define (δ ⊗τ µ)u =
δu10≤u<τ + µu1τ≤u≤T . Then δ ⊗τ µ ∈ A and
Vt ≥ Eδ⊗τµt
[
−e−γ
( ∫ τ
t (δu·dNu+QudSu)+
∫ T
τ (µu·dNu+QudSu)
)
e−γξ
]
= Eδ⊗τµt
[
e−γ
∫ τ
t (δu·dNu+QudSu)Eδ⊗τµτ
[
− e−γ
∫ T
τ (µu·dNu+QudSu)e−γξ
]]
. (39)
From Bayes’ Formula and by noticing that
Lδ⊗τµT
Lδ⊗τµτ
=
LµT
Lµτ
, we get
Eδ⊗τµτ
[
−e−γ
∫ T
τ (µu·dNu+QudSu)e−γξ
]
= E0τ
[
Lδ⊗τµT
Lδ⊗τµτ
(
−e−γ
∫ T
τ (µu·dNu+QudSu)e−γξ
)]
= JT (τ, µ).
Thus, Inequality (39) becomes Vt ≥ Eδ⊗τµt
[
e−γ
∫ τ
t (δu·dNu+QudSu)JT (τ, µ)
]
, and by using
again Bayes’ Formula and by noticing that L
δ⊗τµ
τ
Lδ⊗τµt
= L
δ
τ
Lδt
, we have
Vt ≥
E0t
[
Lδ⊗τµT e
−γ ∫ τt (δu·dNu+QudSu)JT (τ, µ)
]
Lδ⊗τµt
= E0t
[
E0τ
[Lδ⊗τµT
Lδ⊗τµτ
Lδ⊗τµτ
Lδ⊗τµt
e−γ
∫ τ
t (δu·dNu+QudSu)JT (τ, µ)
]]
= E0t
[
E0τ
[Lδ⊗τµT
Lδ⊗τµτ
]Lδ⊗τµτ
Lδ⊗τµt
e−γ
∫ τ
t (δu·dNu+QudSu)JT (τ, µ)
]
= E0t
[
Lδ⊗τµτ
Lδ⊗τµt
e−γ
∫ τ
t (δu·dNu+QudSu)JT (τ, µ)
]
= Eδt
[
e−γ
∫ τ
t (δu·dNu+QudSu)JT (τ, µ)
]
.
Since the previous inequality holds for all µ ∈ Aτ we deduce from monotone convergence
Theorem together with Lemma A.3 that there exists a sequence (µn)n∈N in Aτ such that
Vt ≥ lim
n→+∞
↑ Eδt
[
e−γ
∫ τ
t (δu·dNu+QudSu)JT (τ, µn)
]
= Eδt
[
e−γ
∫ τ
t (δu·dNu+QudSu) lim
n→+∞
↑ JT (τ, µn)
]
= Eδt
[
e−γ
∫ τ
t (δu·dNu+QudSu)Vτ
]
,
thus concluding the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 (i) We proceed in several steps.
Step 1. For δ ∈ A, it follows from the dynamic programming principle of Lemma A.4 that
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the process U δt := Vt e
−γ ∫ t0 (δaudNau+δbudNbu+QudSu), t ∈ [0, T ], defines a Pδ-supermartingale9 for
all δ ∈ A. By standard analysis10, we may then consider it in its ca`dla`g version (by taking
right limits along rationals). By the Doob-Meyer decomposition, we write
U δt = M
δ
t − Aδ,ct − Aδ,dt , (40)
where M δ is a Pδ-martingale and Aδ = Aδ,c + Aδ,d is an integrable non-decreasing pre-
dictable process such that Aδ,c0 = A
δ,d
0 = 0, with pathwise continuous component A
δ,c, and
a piecewise constant predictable process Aδ,d. By the martingale representation theorem
under Pδ, see Lemma A.1, we have
M δt = V0 +
∫ t
0
Z˜δr .dχr −
∫ t
0
Z˜δ,ar λ(δ
a
r )1I{Qr>−q¯}dr −
∫ t
0
Z˜δ,br λ(δ
b
r)1I{Qr<q¯}dr, (41)
predictable process Z˜δ = (Z˜δ,S, Z˜δ,a, Z˜δ,b), where we recall that χ = (S,Na, N b).
Step 2. We show that V is a negative process. In fact, thanks to the uniform boundedness
of δ ∈ A, we show that
LδT
Lδt
≥ αt,T = e− kδ∞σ (NaT−Nat +NbT−Nbt )−2Ae−
kc
σ (e
kδ∞
σ +1)(T−t) > 0, (42)
which implies that Vt ≤ E0
[
−αt,T e−γ
(
δ∞(NaT−Nat +NbT−Nbt )+
∫ T
t QudSu
)
e−γξ
]
< 0.
Step 3. Let Y be the process defined by Vt = −e−γYt for all t ∈ [0, T ]. As Aδ,d is
a predictable point process and the jumps of (Na, N b) are totally inaccessible stopping
times under P0, we have [Na, Aδ,d] = 0 and [N b, Aδ,d] = 0 a.s, see Proposition I.2.24 in
[18]. Using Itoˆ’s formula, we obtain from (40) and (41) that
YT = ξ, and dYt = Z
a
t dN
a
t + Z
b
t dN
b
t + Z
S
t dSt − dIt − dA˜dt ,
where Za, Zb, ZS, I, A˜d are independent of δ, as they may be expressed as ZitdN
i
t =
9Note that Eδ[UδT ] = JT (0, δ) > −∞ using Ho¨lder inequality together with (7) and the uniform
boundedness of the intensities of Na and N b. Hence the process Uδ is integrable.
10In view of the class of contracts considered we know that the principal proposes a contract such that
there exists at least one optimal bid-ask spread for the agent denoted by δ˜. Hence, U δ˜t is a Pδ˜-martingale
and according to Doob regularization result, we know that we can find a ca`dla`g version of U δ˜t under Pδ˜.
Thus Vt admits a ca`dla`g version under Pδ˜, and since all the measure Pδ for δ ∈ A are equivalent, Uδt
admits a ca`dla`g version.
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d[Y,N i]t, i ∈ {a, b}, ZSt σ2dt = d〈Yt, St〉t, A˜d the predictable pure jumps of Y . More-
over, Itoˆ’s Formula yields
Zat = −
1
γ
log(1 +
Z˜δ,at
U δt−
)− δat , Zbt = −
1
γ
log(1 +
Z˜δ,bt
U δt−
)− δbt , ZSt = −
Z˜δ,bt
γU δt−
−Qt−,
and
It =
∫ t
0
(
h(δr, Zr, Qr)dr − 1
γU δr
dAδ,cr
)
, A˜dt =
1
γ
∑
s≤t
log
(
1− ∆A
δ,d
t
U δt−
)
,
with h(δ, z, q) = h(δ, z, q) − 1
2
γσ2(zs)2. In particular, the last relation between A˜d and
Aδ,d shows that ∆at =
−∆Aδ,dt
Uδt−
≥ 0 is independent of δ ∈ A; recall that U δ < 0.
In the subsequent steps, we argue that Z = (ZS, Za, Zb) ∈ Z, and
Aδ,dt = −
∑
s≤t
U δs−∆as = 0, (so that A˜
d
t = 0), and It =
∫ t
0
H(Zr, Qr)dr, t ∈ [0, T ],(43)
where H(z, q) = H(z, q)− 1
2
γσ2(zs)2.
Step 4. Since VT = −1, notice that
0 = sup
δ∈A
Eδ[U δT ]− V0 = sup
δ∈A
Eδ[U δT −M δT ]
= γ sup
δ∈A
E0
[
LδT
∫ T
0
U δr−
(
dIr − h(δr, Zr, Qr)dr + dar
γ
)]
. (44)
Moreover, since the controls are uniformly bounded, we have
U δt ≤ −βt := Vte−γδ∞(N
a
t −Na0 +Nbt−Nb0)−γ
∫ t
0 QrdSr < 0. (45)
Then, since Aδ,d ≥ 0, U δ ≤ 0, and dIt − h(δt, Zt, Qt) ≥ 0, it follows from (44) together
with the inequalities (42) and (45) that
0 ≤ sup
δ∈A
E0
[
α0,T
∫ T
0
−βr−
(
dIr − h(δr, Zr, Qr)dr + dar
γ
)]
= −E0
[
α0,T
∫ T
0
βr−
(
dIr −H(Zr, Qr)dr + dar
γ
)]
.
As α0,T
∫ T
0
βr−
(
dIr −H(Zr, Qr)dr) ≥ 0 and α0,T
∫ T
0
βrdar ≥ 0, this implies (43).
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Step 5. We now prove that Z ∈ Z by showing that
sup
δ∈A
sup
t∈[0,T ]
Eδ[e−γ(p+1)Yt ] <∞ for some p > 0. (46)
Using Ho¨lder inequality together with Condition (7) and the boundedness of the intensities
of Na and N b, we have that supδ∈A Eδ[|U δT |p′+1] <∞ for some p′ > 0. Hence
sup
δ∈A
sup
t∈[0,T ]
Eδ[|U δt |p
′+1] = sup
δ∈A
Eδ[|U δT |p
′+1] <∞,
because U δ is a negative P δ-supermartingale. This leads to (46) using Ho¨lder inequality,
the uniform boundedness of the intensities ofNa andN b and that e−γY = U δeγ
∫ ·
0(δ
a
udN
a
u+δ
b
udN
b
u+QudSu).
Step 6. We finally prove uniqueness of the representation. Let (Y0, Z), (Y
′
0 , Z
′) ∈ R × Z
be such that ξ = Y Y0,ZT = Y
Y ′0 ,Z
′
T . By following the line of the verification argument in the
proof of Theorem 3.1 (ii), we obtain the equality Y Y0,Zt = Y
Y ′0 ,Z
′
t by considering the value
of the continuation utility of the market maker
− exp(−γY Y0,Zt ) = − exp(−γY Y
′
0 ,Z
′
t ) = ess sup
δ∈A
Eδt [−e−γ(PL
δ
T− PLδt+ξ)], t ∈ [0, T ].
This in turn implies that ZitdN
i
t = Z
′i
tdN
i
t = d[Y
Y0,Z , N i]t, i ∈ {a, b}, and ZSt σ2dt =
Z ′St σ
2dt = d〈Y, S〉t, t ∈ [0, T ]. Hence (Y0, Z) = (Y ′0 , Z ′).
A.5 Proof of Theorem 4.2
The proof of the main result of Theorem 4.2 requires the following technical result. We
observe that this is the place where the first integrability condition in (7) is needed.
Lemma A.5. Let Z ∈ Z. There exists C > 0 and ε > 0 such that
sup
t∈[0,T ]
Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Z
T )[|KZt |1+ε] ≤ C.
Proof. We use again the notation KZt := e
−η(c(Nat +Nbt )−Y 0,Zt ), t ∈ [0, T ], for all Z ∈ Z. Let
p > 1. By using Ho¨lder’s inequality and the uniform boundedness of the intensities of Na
and N b, we deduce that there exists C ′ > 0 such that
Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Z
T )[|KZt |p] ≤ C ′E0[(e−γY
0,Z
t )−
p′η
γ ]
p
p′ ,
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with any p′ > p. Thus,
Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Z
T )[|KZt |p] ≤ C ′
(
1 + E0
[
(e−γY
0,Z
t )−
p′η
γ
])
= C ′
(
1 + E0
[(
− sup
δ∈A
Eδt
[
− e−γ(Y 0,ZT +PLδT−PLδt )
])− p′η
γ
])
.
By Jensen’s inequality and Ho¨lder’s inequality, we deduce for any p′′ > p′ that
Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Z
T )[|KZt |p] ≤ C ′
(
1 + E0
[
sup
δ∈A
Eδt [ep
′η(Y 0,ZT +PL
δ
T−PLδt )]
])
≤ C ′
(
1 + E0
[
sup
δ∈A
Eδt [ep
′′ηY 0,ZT ]
])
.
By using a dynamic programming principle, similarly to the proof of Lemma A.4 by
noticing that the family
(
J˜(µ, δ) = Eδτ [ep
′′ηY 0,ZT ]
)
µ∈Aτ
is directly upwards, we get
Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Z
T )[|KZt |p] ≤ C ′
(
1 + sup
δ∈A
Eδ
[
ep
′′ηY 0,ZT
])
.
By setting ε = η
′−η
3
, if we take p = 1 + ε, then p′ = p+ ε and p′′ = p′ + ε, we obtain
Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Z
T )[|KZt |1+ε] ≤ C ′
(
1 + sup
δ∈A
Eδ
[
eη
′Y 0,ZT
])
.
From the definition of Z (involving the first integrability condition in (7)), we get
Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Z
T )[|KZt |1+ε] ≤ C, t ∈ [0, T ], with C = C ′
(
1 + sup
δ∈A
Eδ
[
eη
′Y 0,ZT
])
< +∞.
Proof of Theorem 4.2 In order to prove the theorem, we verify that the function v
introduced in (20) coincides at (0, Q0) with the value function of the reduced exchange
problem (13), with maximum achieved at the optimal control Zˆ.
The function v is negative bounded and has bounded gradient. Moreover, since δ∞ ≥ ∆∞,
it follows that v is a solution of the HJB equation (14) of the exchange reduced problem,
see Lemma A.2. For Z ∈ Z, denote
KZt = e
−η
(
c(Nat −Na0 +Nbt−Nb0)−Y 0,Zt
)
, t ∈ [0, T ].
By direct application of Itoˆ’s formula, and substitution of ∂tv from the HJB equation
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satisfied by v, we see that
d
[
v(t, Qt)K
Z
t
]
= KZt−
(
(hZt −Ht)dt+ ηv(t, Qt)Zst dSt
+
∑
i=a,b
[
v(t, Qt− + ∆Qt)e−η(c−Z
i
t) − v(t, Qt−)
]
dN˜
δˆ(Y Yˆ0,Z),i
t
)
, (47)
where, using the notations of (15) and the subsequent equations,
Ht := HE
(
Qt, v(t, Qt), v(t, Qt + 1), v(t, Qt − 1)
)
,
hZt := h
1
E
(
Qt, v(t, Qt), Z
S
t ) + 1I{Qt>−q¯}h
0
E
(
v(t, Qt), v(t, Qt − 1), Zat
)
+1I{Qt<q¯}h
0
E
(
v(t, Qt), v(t, Qt + 1), Z
b
t
)
.
Exploiting the fact that v is bounded and that KZ is uniformly integrable, see Lemma
A.5, we get that
(
v(t, Qt)K
Z
t
)
t∈[0,T ] is a P
δˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Z
T )-supermartingale and by Doob-Meyer
decomposition theorem, the local martingale term in (47) is a true martingale. Hence
v(0, Q0) = Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Z
T )
[
v(T,QT )K
Z
T +
∫ T
0
KZt (Ht − hZt )dt
]
≥ Eδˆ(Y Yˆ0,ZT )[v(T,QT )KZT ] = Eδˆ(Y Yˆ0,ZT )[−KZT ],
by the boundary condition v(T, .) = −1. By arbitrariness of Z ∈ Z, this provides the
inequality v(0, Q0) ≥ supZ∈Z Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ 0,Z
T )[−KZT ] = vE0 .
On the other hand, consider the maximizer Zˆ of the reduced exchange problem, induced
by the feedback controls zˆ in (16). As Zˆ is bounded, it follows that Zˆ ∈ Z. Moreover,
hZˆ − H = 0, by definition, so that the last argument leads to the equality v(0, Q0) =
Eδˆ(Y
Yˆ0,Zˆ
T )
[ −KZˆT ], instead of the inequality. This shows that v(0, Q0) = vE0 , the reduced
exchange problem of (13), with optimal control Zˆ. From Theorem 3.1, the corresponding
optimal market maker response of the market maker is given by (10) with ξ = Y Yˆ0,ZˆT .
Moreover, Condition (17) implies that | − Zit + 1γ log(1 + σkk )| ≤ δ∞, i = a, b. Hence the
optimal effort can be reduced to (24).
A.6 Proof of Theorem 6.1
The proof of Theorem 6.1 is divided in two steps. First we show that there exists a sym-
metric and Markovian Nash equilibrium for the problem (29). Then, we show that this
Nash equilibrium is unique among the class of symmetric Nash equilibria.
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Existence of a symmetric Markovian Nash equilibrium. We denote by v a smooth
solution to (32) or equivalently (33). Note that ζ0 as defined in Theorem 6.1 is a deter-
ministic function of t, Qt. Denote by Kζt the process defined for any ζ ∈ Z by
Kζt := eη
{ ∫ T
0
∑
i=a,b(ζ
i
t− cN )dN it+ζSt dSt+[HˆS(Qt,ζ
S,0
t ,ζ
S
t )−
∑
i=a,b Hˆ
i(Qt,ζ
i,0
t ,ζ
i
t)
)
dt
}
,
with
Hˆ i(q, z˜, z) = H i(z + (N − 1)z˜, q)− N − 1
N
H i(Nz˜, q). (48)
Note that
dKζt = ηKζt ζSt dSt +
∑
i=a,b
Kζt−(eη(ζ
i
t− cN ) − 1)dN it
+ηKζt
(
HˆS(Qt, ζ
S,0
t , ζ
S
t )−
∑
i=a,b
Hˆ i(Qt, ζ
i,0
t , ζ
i
t) +
η
2
σ2|ζSt |2
)
dt.
Applying Ito’s Formula, we obtain
d(v(t, Qt)Kζt ) = Kζt ∂tv(t, Qt)dt
+Kζt
(
ηv(t, Qt)
(
HˆS(Qt, ζ
S,0(Qt), ζ
S
t )−
∑
i=a,b
Hˆ i(Qt, ζ
i,0
t , ζ
i
t) +
η
2
σ2|ζSt |2)
)
dt
+ηKζt v(t, Qt)ζSt dSt +Kζt−
∑
i=a,b
(v(t, Qt + ∆Qt)− v(t, Qt))eη(ζit− cN )dN it
= Kζt
(
∂tv(t, Qt) + ηv(t, Qt)F
ζ
t
)
dt+ ηKζt v(t, Qt)ζSt dSt
+Kζt−
∑
i=a,b
(v(t, Qt + ∆Qt)− v(t, Qt))eη(ζit− cN )dN˜ it ,
where
F ζt = F
S(t, Qt, ζ
S
t ) + F
0(t, Qt, v(t, Qt), v(t, Qt + 1), ζ
b
t )1Qt<Q
+F 0(t, Qt, v(t, Qt), v(t, Qt − 1), ζat )1Qt>−Q.
Since v satisfies HJB equation (32), we deduce that Eδˆ(ζ+(N−1)ζ0)[−KζT ] ≤ v(0, Q0), with
equality for ζS = ζS,0 and ζ i = ζ i,0.
Uniqueness among the set of general symmetric Nash equilibria. We now prove
that if there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium, it is unique and given by the Markovian
equilibrium ξ0 defined by (36). Let ξ0 characterized by (30) for general ζ0. We consider
the dynamic value function of any exchange given ξ0 fixed by the other, denoted by Vt(ξ
0)
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and defined in view of Remark 6.1 by
Vt(ξ
0) = eηYˆ0ess sup
ζ∈Z
Eδˆ(ζ+(N−1)ζ
0)
t
[
− e
−η
( ∫ T
t
∑
i=a,b
( c
N
−ζir)dN ir−
∫ T
t ζ
S
r dSr−
∫ T
t Hˆ
S
r (ζ
S
r )−
∑
i=a,b
Hˆir(ζ
i
r)dr
)]
,
with HˆSr (z) = Hˆ
S
r (Qr, ζ
S,0
r , z) and Hˆ
i
r(z) = Hˆ
i
r(Qr, ζ
i,0
r , z). By using a DPP similarly
to A.4, we prove that (Vt(ξ
0)Kζt )t∈[0,T ] is a Pζ+(N−1)ζ0-super martingale. The martingale
condition thus provides the optimal ζ played by the representative exchange given that
the others choose ζ0. By using a Doob-Meyer decomposition, the martingale property
leads to the solution of the following BSDE
dRt = U
S
t dSt +
∑
i=a,b
U itdN˜
i
t − Ft(Ut, Qt)dt, RT = 0 (49)
with
Ft(u, q) := sup
ζS
(− HˆSt (ζS)− σ2η2 |ζS − uS|2))
+
∑
i=a,b
sup
ζi
(
Hˆ it(ζ
i)− λi,ζt
(
ui +
1− e−η(ui−ζi+ cN )
η
))
,
with λi,ζt = λ(δˆ(ζ
i + (N − 1)ζ i,0)).We directly derive the maximizers
ζS,?t = −
γ(N − 1)
η + γ
ζS,0t −
γ
η + γ
Qt − η
η + γ
USt ,
ζ i,?t = U
i
t +
c
N
+
1
η
log
( k(k + σ(γ − η))
(k + ση)(k + σγ)
+
U itkη
k + ση
)
.
Since ζ0 is assumed to be a symmetric Nash equilibrium, we obtain from Definition 6.1
that ζS,0t and ζ
i,0
t are necessarily uniquely determined as function of Qt and Ut by
ζS,0t = −
γ
η +Nγ
Qt − η
η +Nγ
USt ,
and
ζ i,0t = U
i
t +
c
N
+
1
η
log
( k(k + σ(γ − η))
(k + ση)(k + σγ)
+
U itkη
k + ση
)
.
Hence, we note that the BSDE (49) is Markovian. The integro-partial differential equation
associated with this BSDE remains to solve (32) for which we know that there exists a
continuous solution given by v(t, q). We thus deduce that if there is a symmetric Nash
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equilibrium, it is Markovian in the sense of Definition 6.2 and the first step of the proof
shows that it is unique.
A.7 First best exchange problem
In this section, we analyze the first best problem of the exchange. In this setting the
exchange optimally chooses the contract ξ and the optimal bid-ask posting policy of the
market maker under her participation constraint. Introducing a Lagrange multiplier λ > 0
to penalize for this constraint, we reduced the first best exchange value function to the
unconstrained problem:
V FB0 = inf
λ>0
sup
ξ∈C,δ∈A
EPδ
[− e−η(c(NaT−NbT )−ξ) − λe−γ(ξ+XT+QTST ) − λR],
with C =
{
ξ, FT -measurable such that (7) is satisfied
}
.
We first compute the supremum on ξ by fixing λ, δ. The first order condition in ξ is
e−η(c(N
a
T−NbT )−ξ?λ) = λγ
η
e−γ(ξ
?
λ+XT+QTST ), implying
ξ?λ =
1
η + γ
(
log(
λγ
η
)− γ(XT +QTST ) + ηc(NaT +N bT )
)
.
Substituting this expression, we see that
V FB0 = inf
λ>0
sup
δ∈A
EPδ
[− λη + γ
η
e−γ(ξ
?
λ+XT+QTST ) − λR]
= inf
λ>0
sup
δ∈A
EPδ
[− λη + γ
η
( η
λγ
) γ
η+γ e−
γη
γ+η
(XT+QTST+c(N
a
T+N
b
T )) − λR]
= inf
λ>0
λ
[η + γ
η
( η
λγ
) γ
η+γ V˜0 −R
]
, with V˜0 = sup
δ∈A
EPδ
[− e− γηγ+η (XT+QTST+c(NaT+NbT ))].
As V˜0 is independent of λ, we obtain the optimal Lagrange multiplier λ
? = η
γ
(
V˜0
R
)1+ η
γ
,
and we deduce the optimal first best contract:
ξ? = ξ?λ∗ =
1
η + γ
(
log(
λ?γ
η
)− γ(XT +QTST ) + ηc(NaT +N bT )
)
.
We finally solve the problem V˜0. Note that by setting δ˜ := δ + c in view of the definition
of Pδ given by (4) together with (2) we get
V˜0 = sup
δ˜∈A˜
EPδ˜−c
[− e−Γ(XT+QTST )], with Γ = γη
γ + η
,
39
and where A˜ is defined similarly to A with bound δ∞ + c. We are then reduced to the
framework of [3, 13] so that the optimal bid-ask spreads are given by
δ˜it = −c+
1
Γ
log(1 +
σΓ
k
) +
σ
k
log
( u˜FB(t, Qt−)
u˜FB(t, Qt− + εi)
)
, i ∈ {b, a}, (εa, εb) = (−1, 1).
where u˜FB is the unique solution of the linear differential equation
u˜FB
∣∣
t=T
= 1, ∂tu˜
FB(t, q)− F
CFB1 ,C˜1
FB(q, u˜FB(t, q), u˜FB(t, q + 1), u˜FB(t, q − 1)) = 0, (50)
with constants CFB1 =
σΓk
2
and C˜1
FB
= A
(
1 + σΓ
k
)−(1+σΓ
k
)
, and so that
vFB(0, 0) = V˜0
FB
, with u˜FB = (−v˜FB)− kση .
Since the solution of PDE (50) is different from the solution of (19), we deduce that
the value function of the exchange in the first best case does not coincide with his value
function in the second best model.
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